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The Stalinist Terror of the years 1936-53 claimed millions of victims, including hundreds of 
German anti-fascists who had gone to the Soviet Union in the 1930s as political émigrés 
(Politemigranten or Ostemigranten) on the orders of the German Communist Party (KPD).
1
 
Those who survived and later took up residence in post-war East Germany (the GDR), as 
opposed to the West German Federal Republic (the FRG) or West Berlin, fall into three 
categories. First was a very small number of KPD functionaries who had already been 
rehabilitated by various organs of Soviet justice and readmitted to the KPD exile group in 
Moscow as a result of the ‘mini-thaw’ of late 1938 to early 1940. Typically they were able to 
return to Germany in 1945 or shortly afterwards.
2
 Secondly, there was a handful of 
individuals who came back in the late 1940s, usually a result of the direction intervention of 
the future GDR President Wilhelm Pieck. Among them were Werner Eberlein, son of the 
murdered KPD functionary Hugo Eberlein, who was repatriated in 1948 and went on to have 
an illustrious career in East Germany, rising to the Politburo by 1986;
3
 Susanne Leonhard, 
mother of the senior party official and Comintern school graduate Wolfgang Leonhard who 
later defected to the west;
4
 and Fridolin and Horst Seydewitz, sons of the first post-war 
Minister-President of the East German Land of Saxony, Max Seydewitz.
5
 Taken together, 
these first two categories added up to about 30 persons.
6
 Between 1949 and 1954 there were 
virtually no German returnees from the Gulag and hardly any repatriation of former émigrés 
at all. This was a time when East Germany’s rulers took a hard line on alleged ‘traitors’ and 
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‘enemies of the party’, defending the show trials that had taken place in the Soviet Union in 
the late 1930s while instigating their own campaigns against ‘deviationists’, ‘Trotskyists’ and 
‘sectarians’.7 The third, and largest, group of surviving German victims – consisting of 
around 150 ex-prisoners and their dependents – had to wait until after Stalin’s death in March 
1953 before receiving the news that they could finally go home. Between 1954 and 1962 
most of them received permission to settle in the GDR.
8
  
Using memoirs of German communists who were repatriated in the 1950s and early 1960s 
after years spent in Soviet camps, as well as official party records and newspaper sources, 
this chapter will explore the practical and discursive limits of the rehabilitation process in 
East Germany. It will also assess how far the widening of knowledge about Stalin’s crimes 
led to a ‘reworking of the political imaginary’9 inside the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). 
The term ‘political imaginary’ requires some explanation. On the one hand, following Susan 
Buck-Morss, it can refer to the general desire in both east and west for ‘representational 
concreteness’ when it came to exhibiting (supposedly still realisable) ‘utopian visions’ and 
‘collective goals’ to a mass public in face of the constant uncertainties thrown up by events in 
world politics. Lenin and Stalin of course both featured strongly in the ‘political imaginary’ 
of all Soviet bloc countries. But the classic communist trope of a ‘vanguard party’ boldly 
‘making “history”’ by guiding the people towards a final victorious assault against a range of 
capitalist, reactionary and ‘Trotskyist’ foes10 was magnified in the GDR’s case by its status as 
a ‘border region’ in the European theatre of the Cold War, with the ‘enemy’ quite literally on 
the doorstep in West Berlin and the FRG;
11
 and also by the rapid domination of the SED by a 
group of communists whose experiences of underground activism at home and in exile in the 
1930s and early 1940s had made them particularly suspicious of alleged ‘spies’, ‘revisionists’ 
and ‘counter-revolutionaries’. The East German labour historian Jürgen Kuczynski, who 
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joined the party in 1930 and was an ardent Stalinist and member of the SED inner elite until 
he fell out of favour with the leadership in 1956-59, later wrote of the period of illegal 
struggle before 1945: 
Those years turned us into better comrades, into better fighters for progress – but they 
did not let us be amiable people…. We become deeply distrustful in our daily lives, 
while at the same time putting all our confidence in the great path of humanity, in the 
future, in youth, in the victory of the good and the beautiful.
12
 
More parochially, ‘political imaginary’ can denote the sense of historical mission and 
purpose that the SED communicated to its members, both young and old, to GDR citizens 
more broadly, and to external supporters and opponents. What part did continuing silence, 
censorship and self-censorship in relation to the Stalinist purges have in the cultural 
reproduction of this East German narrative of past and present achievements? And how 
important an influence was the GDR’s intense rivalry with the ‘capitalist-imperialist’ FRG, 
including growing tensions over rearmament and the status of Berlin in the late 1950s?
13
 In 
order to answer these questions, the essay will make some reference to the many victims of 
Soviet military justice, East German political trials and other manifestations of Stalinist terror 
in Germany in the years 1945-55, whose post-1956 claims for rehabilitation were by and 
large ignored by the SED and whose convictions were often only quashed, if at all, by 
German or Russian courts in the 1990s.
14
 However, the main focus will be on German purge 
victims of the 1930s who were released from the Soviet camp system after 1954, usually after 
being formally acquitted by Soviet district or central courts; repatriated to their homeland, on 
the understanding that their homeland was the GDR; and in most cases readmitted to the 
party, in or around the year 1956. 
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Political Context 
Founded in October 1949, the GDR rapidly became one of the most hard-line communist 
states in Eastern Europe, particularly after SED first secretary Walter Ulbricht announced the 
‘accelerated construction of socialism’ in 1952. Although forced into some concessions 
following the failed popular uprising of 17 June 1953, particularly on the social and 
economic fronts,
15
 the regime soon reverted to political type. In 1956 its leaders could 
congratulate themselves on having avoided the big show trials of the late 1940s and early 
1950s which had blighted neighbouring communist countries like Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Czechoslovakia although evidence suggests that they planned such a trial and merely called it 
off at the last minute.
16
 Yet even without a show trial, there had been several rounds of 
expulsions from the ruling party from 1948 onwards; secret trials held without public 
knowledge; and numerous convictions of party members and ordinary citizens, as well as ex-
Nazis and ‘capitalists’, for political or quasi-political offences.17 
In total 13,127 persons were still serving sentences in East German jails for ‘crimes against 
the state’ in the first quarter of 1956, accounting for 31.2 per cent of the prison population.18 
Only in the wake of Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ in February 1956 to the 20th party 
congress of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) did these numbers begin to fall. The regime 
itself claimed to have pardoned or granted early release to 11,896 persons in the course of its 
immediate post-March 1956 investigations of past court cases and sentencing practices, and a 
total of 21,000 persons by October of that year.
19
 Among those regaining their freedom 
(albeit without having their convictions overturned) were several thousand ex-Nazis, 
‘Titoists’, centre-right politicians and Social Democrats who had been condemned by Soviet 
military tribunals (in the period up to January 1950) or East German courts (after 1950) for 
‘misdeeds related to Hitler’s war’, ‘anti-Soviet agitation’ or ‘collaboration with western 
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intelligence agencies’.20 The official SED press emphasised in April 1956 that the reductions 
in sentence were a political good-will gesture towards the west, including the SPD, in line 
with Khrushchev’s ‘peaceful co-existence’ policy and the recent ‘strengthening of socialist 
and anti-militarist forces throughout the world’, and in no way represented an 
acknowledgement of the prisoners’ innocence.21 If the overall release figures for 1956 are 
accurate, however, then the beneficiaries must have included a considerable number of 
people convicted of ‘ordinary’ criminal offences, and not just those serving sentences for 
political crimes. Indeed, at the end of 1956 there were still 6,044 political prisoners in East 
Germany, making up 33.9 per cent of all those in jail, a higher proportion than at the 
beginning of the year.
22
 
Against this background, the fate of surviving German purge victims in the Soviet Union 
remained a highly sensitive, albeit largely hidden issue, with the potential to do serious 
damage both to the GDR’s international standing and its relationship with the Soviet Union. 
In contrast to the releases from East German prisons, which at least received periodic 
mention in the press, it was not a subject for public discussion. But equally it could not be 
ignored in the hope that it would simply go away. Between 1948 and the mid-1950s the 
SED’s leaders had defended the 1930s purges in absolute terms, while acting on the 
assumption that there were no ‘innocent’ victims.23 A similar attitude was prevalent in the 
SED’s sister parties, the West German Communist Party (KPD), which was active until a ban 
imposed by the federal constitutional court in 1956, and the SEW, the Socialist Unity Party of 
West Berlin.
24
 For instance, all three parties vigorously denounced as ‘anti-Soviet 
propaganda’ the claims made by Margarete Buber-Neumann, widow of the murdered KPD 
functionary Heinz Neumann, in her 1949 report Als Gefangene bei Stalin und Hitler. 
Published in the west but banned in the east, this book provided a distressing account of her 
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husband’s arrest and execution, and of her own experiences of betrayal and imprisonment in 
the Soviet Union, followed by delivery into the clutches of the Gestapo and incarceration at 
Ravensbrück, the Nazis’ main concentration camp for women prisoners, in 1940-45.25  
The negative stance taken by the three German communist parties was supported by the 
Soviet authorities who usually refused exit visas to convicted foreign prisoners, even if they 
had served their sentences, and in many cases condemned former Gulag inmates to further 
terms of imprisonment or banishment in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
26
 The Kremlin was 
also at one with the GDR in believing that returnees could either disrupt East German society 
or – if they moved to West Germany via the still open border in Berlin – provide further 
material for anti-communist and human rights groups agitating against the Soviet system. 
Indeed, although by 1951-52 persistent enquiries from relatives had forced the SED to draw 
up a list of close to 180 German men and women missing in the Soviet Union, at least 32 of 
whom were long-term Gulag inmates or anti-fascists murdered in the purges, it is 
questionable whether this list was ever handed on to the Soviet authorities. In their internal 
correspondence, party officials used the uncertainty over whether the Soviets would even 
allow exit visas to such persons as an excuse for inaction.
27
  
After 1953 these assumptions could no longer be taken for granted, however. In the first 
instance, the revision and/or overturning of hundreds of thousands of political sentences in 
the USSR in the wake of the May 1954 decree ‘On the Re-examination of Criminal Cases of 
Persons Convicted of Counter-Revolutionary Offences’ was accompanied by the removal of 
any objections on the part of the Soviet Council of Ministers to the repatriation of 
rehabilitated foreign political internees. Information obtained by the GDR Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs via the East German embassy in Moscow indicated that a growing number of 
German communist ex-prisoners wanted to leave the Soviet Union and had been granted the 
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necessary exit visas. Secondly, the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the 
Soviet Union and West Germany following West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s 
state visit to Moscow in September 1955 raised concerns that the Soviet authorities could 
decide to send released German communist prisoners to the FRG if the GDR refused to 
accept them. Here they might be tempted to reveal the truth about what had happened to them 
under Stalin, following the example of the West German survivor Margarete Buber-Neumann 
or the communist defector Susanne Leonhard, who had fled with her son to Belgrade in 1949 
and then to the FRG in 1950, eventually publishing a memoir of her time in the Gulag in 
1956.
28
 Admittedly, the ban on the KPD in West Germany in August 1956 made it less likely 
that returning victims who were still convinced communists would choose the FRG over the 
GDR. However, West Berlin, which had become an important centre of dissident left and 
human rights activism as well as being a launch pad for many western intelligence and 
propaganda operations against the Soviet bloc, remained an alternative option, at least until 
the building of the wall in 1961.
29
 
Finally, the release of prisoners from the Gulag, including surviving German victims, 
presented the regime in East Berlin with similar dilemmas to the release of the last former 
German POWs of the Second World War from Soviet military captivity and their repatriation 
to East and West Germany, a process which itself was just coming to an end in 1955-56.
30
 
Among the latter were real or presumed Nazi war criminals who had been convicted and 
sentenced by Soviet military tribunals for heinous offences against Soviet civilians during the 
1941-45 period and who were now being amnestied as part of a diplomatic charm offensive 
aimed at winning over Germans in both the FRG and the GDR. Yet the official GDR line 
until 1955 was that purged German communists too must have been saboteurs and traitors, 
placing them on a par with Nazi war criminals. The idea that they might have been victims of 
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malicious denunciations, miscarriages of justice or unlawful purges carried out by organs of 
the Soviet state required a considerable readjustment of previous mind sets and beliefs, both 
before and after Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ in February 1956. 
 
Repatriations 1955-1962 
The first official recognition in the SED party records that current and future applications for 
repatriation from the USSR made via the East German embassy in Moscow might include 
significant numbers of people seeking to return home after years of Soviet imprisonment 
came in an internal document produced by the Central Committee’s cadre department on 7 
February 1955. The document provided the names of 68 adults and their dependants who had 
been granted exit visas by the Soviet authorities since 1954 and were requesting entry to the 
GDR. Some of them had previously appeared on lists of persons who had been refused Soviet 
exit visas, but now had been granted them; others were entirely new names. It was 
recommended ‘that in every case where a permit has been obtained to leave the Soviet Union, 
entry should also be granted to the German Democratic Republic’, but that only those who 
could prove continuous membership of the KPD, the CPSU or the latter’s youth wing, the 
Komsomol, should be automatically accepted into the SED. By contrast ‘in cases where 
membership has been suspended for long periods in the past, or where doubts exist, an 
investigation or clarification should be undertaken by the ZPKK [Central Party Control 
Commission]’.31  
In anticipation of the destitute state of some of the returnees, it was also recommended that 
they each be offered a ‘transition allowance’ (Überbrückungsgeld) of up to 2,000 marks from 
state funds, depending on their individual and family circumstances. In order to prevent them 
all from concentrating in Berlin, which had limited municipal resources to help the sick and 
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old among them, and in view of the danger that some might be tempted, if in Berlin, to 
consider moving west or to try making contact with western relatives, it was recommended 
that those without firm ties to the German capital be dispersed across all 14 provincial 
regions (Bezirke) of the GDR. In practice, though, by April 1959 128 returnees and their 
families were registered as living in East Berlin, representing by far the largest concentration 
of ex-Gulag prisoners in the whole of the republic.
32
    
This initial document was followed by two others. On 21 September 1955 the ZPKK, 
acting as the party’s supreme tribunal, agreed to set up a special commission led by three 
senior party officials whose purpose would be to examine the ‘affairs of comrades who have 
previously spent long periods in the Soviet Union’, and to draw up some criteria for 
rehabilitation ‘so that a concrete judgement can be made in each case’.33 And on 19 April 
1956, in its first report, the special commission recommended the following course of action 
to the Politburo: 
1. .... the ZPKK should be assigned with the task of interviewing returning emigrants 
from the Soviet Union and deciding on their rehabilitation. 
2. In cases where the families of comrades imprisoned in the Soviet Union make 
enquiries on their behalf, the ZPKK should determine whether a rehabiliation [in 
absentia or post-mortem] is possible.
34
 
By this time, the first returnees had already begun to arrive. The figures vary, depending on 
the source, but party records suggest a total of 114 families, made up of 209 individuals, had 
come back between May 1955 and October 1956.
35
 Even so, more were expected. On 1 
August 1956 the Central Committee passed a resolution calling for a ‘faster repatriation of 
former Politemigranten and their dependants from the USSR’ and for extra state funds to 
help with travel arrangements: 
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For.... those whose material circumstances are not good, the GDR’s embassy in 
Moscow will cover the costs of acquiring a Soviet exit visa and the entire costs of the 
journey from current place of residence to Berlin.
36
 
To speed up the process at the Soviet end, the Central Committee’s cadre department also 
recommended the immediate despatch of a party official to Moscow whose job would be to 
resolve practical and other difficulties.  
[Returning] comrades have informed us that.... a large number of Politemigranten 
remain scattered in the furthest reaches of the Soviet Union, and are anxious about 
approaching the GDR’s embassy.... Comrade Viktor Leist, who returned in February 
1956, even found himself arrested on the street when he left the embassy building [in 
Moscow], and was subsequently interrogated about the purpose of his visit there.... A 
further difficulty lies in the fact that many comrades do not even know where the 
GDR embassy is. For instance, Comrade Walter Höfer told us that when, in May this 
year, he was released from 20 years of internment by a commission in Karaganda, 
neither the Information Office, nor the Interior Ministry, nor the militia in Moscow 
could give him the address of the embassy. Finally.... a Polish student found it for 
him....
37
 
Most of the returnees came by train, arriving at Berlin’s Ostbahnhof (eastern railway station) 
where they were met by a delegation sent by the party’s Central Committee. Temporary 
accommodation was provided in special party-owned hotels in Berlin, after which the 
returnees were dispersed to more permanent lodgings. Those arriving in 1956 reported 
receiving up to 5,400 marks to help find new houses or flats, as well as special ration cards 
usually reserved for senior party members.
38
 Indeed, the Central Committee’s cadre 
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department had recommended an increase in the maximum Überbrückungsgeld to 4,000 
marks at the end of 1955 and to 6,000 marks in October 1956.
39
   
In 1957 and 1958 further repatriations took place, particularly following an agreement 
signed between the GDR and the Soviet Union on 7 January 1957 concerning family 
reunions. Even in the early 1960s one or two cases were still outstanding. In total around 180 
German emigrants who had survived the Stalinist terror were repatriated to the GDR between 
May 1945 and June 1962, nearly all of them (150 or so) after 1954.
40
 Between October 1955 
and July 1962 the ZPKK decided on restoration of party membership in 257 cases. For 66 
individuals, rehabilitation was granted posthumously or – where exact details were unknown 
– ‘after presumed death’. Among them were the above-mentioned Hugo Eberlein and several 
other prominent KPD functionaries shot in Moscow in the 1930s and 1940s, such as 
Hermann Remmele and Willy Leow. This represented a mere fraction of the total number of 
murdered political émigrés, however, and some conspicuous names were still missing.
41
 
Meanwhile, the majority of the 257 rehabilitations were granted to living persons who had 
returned since 1954 to the GDR and who in many cases had been formally acquitted of past 
criminal offences before leaving the Soviet Union. A lucky few, who seem to have had run-
ins with the KPD exile group only, and not the NKVD, were merely hoping to have 
reprimands expunged from their party records. However, most of the returnees had been 
formally expelled from the KPD following their arrest by the Soviet secret police, and were 
now being instructed to seek readmission to the SED as part of the rehabilitation process. 
What kind of welcome did they get, beyond an interview with officials from the ZPKK 
followed by formal confirmation of restoration of party membership?   
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Ulbricht, rehabilitations and the limits of de-Stalinisation 
Although it pardoned or granted early release to several thousand of its own political and 
criminal prisoners in 1956 (and again in 1960), the East German regime did not have the 
same judicial powers to alter verdicts or sentences passed by organs of the Soviet state. 
Rehabilitation of returning German communist victims of the 1930s purges was therefore a 
separate, quasi-judicial process with its own political logic and rationale as determined by the 
ruling SED and its central apparatus.
42
 The purpose, at least as far as the ZPKK and the 
majority of Politburo members were concerned, was to make restored party membership and 
the privileges that went with it the basis for renewed discipline and control, not to correct past 
injustices or to open up awkward questions about the Stalinist past. Indeed, the potential for a 
more drastic rethink of the GDR’s ‘political imaginary’ along anti-Stalinist lines was 
thwarted by the SED’s leaders even before the conservative backlash which followed the 
crushing of the Hungarian uprising at the end of 1956. After February 1956 Ulbricht was 
obliged to look as if he were following Khrushchev’s lead by denouncing the ‘cult of 
personality’ as a distortion of ‘Leninist norms of party life’ and rejecting Stalin as one of the 
great classic theorists of Marxism.
43
 However, when it came to other aspects of de-
Stalinisation he always managed to stay one or two paces behind. In a speech to a closed 
session of the Central Committee in late July 1956, for instance, he blamed the former Soviet 
Interior Minister Lavrentii Beria rather than Stalin for the 1930s purges and suggested that 
the GDR had already defeated Beria’s attempts to stage a show trial within its borders in 
1953.
44
 There had, it seemed, been no major breach of socialist legality and no problematic 
‘cult of personality’ in East Germany. Rather than allow a potentially divisive discussion of 
this apparent non-issue, the party had to maintain ‘a firm line’ [eine feste Linie] in face of 
attempts by enemies past and present to sew discord within its ranks.
45
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After July 1956 the implication of these claims became more obvious. While the regime 
paid lip-service to the need for reform, anti-Stalinist intellectuals came under increased 
pressure, a process which culminated in the arrest, prosecution and imprisonment of the 
philosopher Wolfgang Harich and the head of the Aufbau publishing house Walter Janka, 
both of whom received long prison terms after trials in March and July 1957. Several other 
leading critics of Ulbricht were jailed, purged from the party or senior party positions, 
expelled from universities or forced to recant in a wave of repression lasting into 1958 and 
beyond.
46
 Among those who fell under suspicion during this period was Nathan Steinberger, 
a rehabilitated returnee in 1955 who, because he chose to remain active in the Jewish 
community in East Berlin and cultivated contacts with relatives in Britain and Belgium, was 
removed from his position as departmental chief in the state planning commission in 1958.
47
 
Altogether, although the number of political prisoners in the GDR fell to a low of 4,965 in the 
second quarter of 1957, it rose steadily over the next year or so, to reach 7,913 by the third 
quarter of 1958. The new amnesty announced in October 1960 led to the release of 15,621 
prisoners, including 3,366 ‘politicals’, but the total count for the latter crept up again to 8,117 
by the end of 1961. This was in spite of the fact that Ulbricht’s internal authority was 
immeasurably strengthened by the building of the Berlin Wall in August of that year.
48
 
In the meantime, after 1962 repatriations from the Soviet Union were officially considered 
to have been completed, and a line was drawn under the internal process of rehabilitation.
49
 
True, in nearly all of the cases it examined between 1955 and 1962, the ZPKK had found in 
favour of restoration of unbroken party membership. For some returnees, this meant that they 
could now claim to have been loyal comrades for 30 or even 40 years, while all traces of 
what had happened to them in Soviet exile were expunged from their party record. One early 
example of this re-writing of party history came in 1958, in the run-up to the 40
th
 anniversary 
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of the November 1918 revolution. The official SED newspaper Neues Deutschland carried an 
article by the veteran communist Martha Globig, who recalled how, as a 17-year-old activist 
in the Spartacist League, she had taken part in the founding conference of the pro-communist 
FSJ (Freie Sozialistische Jugend) on 27 October 1918 and in an anti-war march in Berlin on 
28 October 1918. The protestors were blocked by the Imperial German police, but 
.... the young people at the head of the march would not allow themselves to be 
intimidated and sought to break through the cordon. Arrests followed. When we 
sought to free the prisoners, the police shot at us at blank range and wounded 
Comrade [Fritz] Globig in the arm. The crowd pulled back but then surged forward 
again with renewed determination.... In this way, the delegates representing young 
workers from across Germany had not only organised a spirited conference, but stood 
shoulder to shoulder with their comrades from Berlin in the battle for the streets.
50
 
For the co-writer of the Neues Deutschland piece, this made Globig a role model for socialist 
youth in the GDR: 
The heroism and sacrifice of young workers in the decades-long revolutionary 
struggle has paved the way for what we have and take for granted today. Because the 
working class holds the reigns of power, because it has smashed the power of the 
militarists, the old rulers are also no longer able to monopolise education [and] our 
young people now have equal rights and opportunities for development. On 16 
November [1958] our young voters, as fully-fledged citizens, will make their own 
stand against militarism and war, thereby safeguarding their bright and glorious 
future.
51
 
What the article failed to mention, however, was that Globig had spent almost 20 years as a 
Gulag prisoner in the Soviet Union. Her conviction had been quashed by a Moscow court in 
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December 1955, and she had been able to return to Germany in April 1956. Her formal 
rehabilitation and reacceptance into the party was subsequently ratified by the ZPKK in 
October 1956, which agreed to backdate her party membership to 1917.
52
 She was given a 
job in the party’s Institute for Marxism-Leninism (IML), and in July 1961 she was honoured 
with an official announcement of her 60
th
 birthday in Neues Deutschland, a mark of 
recognition reserved for esteemed party veterans.
53
 However, although her carefully-
reconstructed past was now held up as an inspiration to East German youth, and although she 
was called upon by the IML to record her autobiographical memories for the benefit of the 
‘Memoir Section’ (Sektor Erinnerungen) of the Central Party Archive in 1962, it was made 
clear to her – and she accepted – that she could not discuss her experiences in the Soviet 
Union in public.
54
 The SED needed heroes, not victims. Ordinary party members and the 
general public were left entirely in the dark about the rehabilitation process, while even the 
rehabilitees were only informed verbally about the decision to readmit them. They were 
provided with no formal documentation, and indeed were required to hand over any Soviet 
documents in their possession – especially those pertaining to their arrest, imprisonment, 
release and judicial rehabilitation – to the party officials who came to meet them at Berlin’s 
Ostbahnhof.
55
  
The majority of East Germans were also kept in the dark about developments in the Soviet 
Union post-1956, including further revelations about Stalin’s crimes in the 1930s and beyond. 
From the party’s perspective, the situation in the GDR differed from that in the USSR, for in 
the former there had supposedly never been any terroristic personal dictatorship, arrests of 
innocent people or abuse of state power, and therefore there was no need to use rehabiliation 
as a means of emancipating society from fear of arbitrary persecution. The fact that senior 
KPD functionaries had remained silent or looked the other way while the Soviet authorities 
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surrendered at least 350 German and Austrian anti-fascists to the Gestapo between November 
1939 and May 1941 was conveniently forgotten, and significantly both Margarete Buber-
Neumann and her murdered husband, Heinz Neumann, officially remained ‘traitors’ to the 
communist cause rather than being recast as innocent victims of the 1930s purges.
56
 Efforts 
were also made to stop detailed knowledge of Khrushchev’s 1956 speech from spreading 
beyond the senior levels of the party,
57
 and in 1962, during an official trip to the Crimea, 
Ulbricht responded to news of the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s short novel One 
Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich by pointedly telling the Soviet leader: ‘We will never 
allow such camp literature in the GDR!’ [Bei uns wird keine Lagerliteratur veröffentlicht!]. 
This remark has the added poignancy that it was uttered in the presence of the former Gulag 
prisoner Werner Eberlein, who by the late 1950s had become Ulbricht’s chief interpreter on 
official visits to the USSR and was therefore obliged to translate it into Russian for 
Khrushchev’s benefit.58 
The threat posed by Solzhenitsyn’s book could be dealt with quite simply by banning it in 
the GDR, a move formally announced by Ulbricht in his closing address to a meeting 
between top party and state officials and East German writers and artists in March 1963.
59
 In 
the early 1960s the SED’s propaganda machine also cynically exploited the international 
publicity given to the trial of the Holocaust’s chief architect Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem – 
and to trials of SS and other war criminals in the FRG – to focus attention on (West) 
Germany’s Nazi past rather than the GDR’s Stalinist past and present.60 When, in the 
immediate aftermath of the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, the West German 
novelist Günter Grass described Ulbricht as a ‘concentration camp commandant’ in an open 
letter to the President of the East German Writers’ Association, Anna Seghers, this too was 
dismissed as an imperialist distortion.
61
 As long as none of its own cultural luminaries sought 
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to raise difficult questions about the subject of Stalinism, in other words, provided they 
remained focused on the achievements of socialism, the reactionary, bestial nature of Nazism 
and the existence of former Nazis in the West German establishment, the East German 
regime felt reasonably safe.  
In 1964-65, however, the senior SED officials in charge of cultural policy, notably the 
Politburo’s ideology chief, Kurt Hager, and Ulbricht’s successor-in-waiting, Erich Honecker, 
became increasingly concerned that a number of East German writers were spreading a 
sceptical view of the regime’s approach to de-Stalinisation, especially through publications in 
the west or at international gatherings of artists from socialist countries. Three people in 
particular were singled out for criticism by Honecker at the 11th Plenary Session of the 
Central Committee in December 1965: the novelist Stefan Heym, the poet and song-writer 
Wolf Biermann, and the scientist Robert Havemann. Underlying these concerns were also 
broader fears that East German youth, if exposed to radical rejections of the Stalinist past, 
might become less wary of the ‘false’ attractions of the west, especially as so many teenagers 
were already becoming fans of 1960s ‘Beat Music’ with its anti-authoritarian ethos and 
apparent threat to public order.
62
 
Of the three writers in question, Heym showed the greatest interest in the issue of German 
victims of the 1930s and 40s purges in the Soviet Union. This was particularly after 
discovering the fate of his friend, the anti-fascist writer Ernst Ottwalt, who disappeared into 
the clutches of the NKVD in Moscow in 1936 after being denounced by a German comrade 
and – as became known in 1958 – died in a Siberian prison camp in 1943.63 In 1963 Heym 
began writing a novel, The Architects, motivated in part by his distress at Ottwalt’s fate, and 
set in the East Germany of 1955-56. It told the story of a successful and much-admired 
communist architect, Arnold Sundstrom, whose professional and personal life is turned 
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upside down by the return from the Gulag of a former colleague he had known in Soviet 
exile, and by his own refusal to face up to what had happened during those dark times. 
Although the novel was never released in the GDR, and indeed did not appear in print at all 
until 2000,
64
 its core underlying themes made their way into several critical speeches and 
articles Heym delivered in the period 1964-65, some of which – having been banned at home 
– were later published in the west. The most provocative of these was an uninvited, 
impromptu address to a colloquium organised by the East German Writers’ Association 
which took place in Berlin in the presence of guests from other Soviet bloc countries in 
December 1964, a few weeks after Khrushchev’s fall from power. Copies of the speech were 
handed out freely to journalists, one appearing in the West German newspaper Die Zeit in 
February 1965.
65
 Another copy ended up in the hands of Kurt Hager, who sent it to members 
of the Politburo as a cause for concern, with a covering note also mentioning the fact that 
Polish and Soviet delegates had criticised the GDR for refusing to allow the publication of 
Solzhenitsyn’s Ivan Denisovich or the official distribution of works by European classical 
and modernist authors like Proust, Kafka and Joyce, all of which were now freely circulating 
in their own countries.
66
 
Heym’s speech began with a tale about a Soviet writer who submitted a film script to the 
Kremlin with the title ‘Stalin vacates the room’, only to have it sent back with a correction 
made in the dictator’s own hand, so that it now read ‘The great Stalin vacates the room’. His 
criticism, however, was directed less at Stalin and more at the many cultural functionaries in 
East Germany who now eagerly denounced or mocked the ‘cult of personality’, to which they 
were once subordinated, but otherwise tolerated continued ‘lies and pretences’67 about the 
past and in so doing failed to recognise the moral imperative ‘that we must now sweep out 
the dirt from underneath the carpet, wash the carpet itself, and disinfect the room that Stalin 
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has vacated’. The counter-argument, that greater openness about Stalin’s crimes could be 
used by the capitalist world to undermine socialism, was in his view spurious: ‘We should not 
fear the pain which comes with seeking out the truth. The truth is always revolutionary.…’.68 
However, this Orwellian definition of truth was exactly what Honecker chose to criticise in 
his speech to the 11th Plenum in December 1965, describing it as ‘an ideology based on petit-
bourgeois scepticism’ [eine Ideologie des spießbürgerlichen Skeptizismus] which had no 
place in contemporary East Germany: ‘Our GDR is a clean state. It holds to uncompromising 
standards of ethics and morality, decency and good habits’.69 Like Biermann and Havemann, 
Heym found that his works were no longer discussed in East German universities, that his 
mail was intercepted, and that in effect his attempts to open up an honest discussion about 
Stalinism had been met with a brick wall of censure and censorship. Only in the mid-1970s 
did East German publishing houses again dare to bring out editions of some of his less 
controversial writings.
70
 
 
Conclusion 
The 11th Plenum in December 1965 signalled the end of all efforts to link rehabilitations with 
an open political confrontation with the causes and consequences of East Germany’s Stalinist 
past, a position which lasted for at least the next two decades. Behind the scenes, returnees 
were rewarded for their silence and continued loyalty. Some were provided with jobs in the 
party or party-controlled research institutes. Others secured positions in academia or the 
media. One or two came to the attention of the Stasi, including the history professor and 
former Gulag internee Wolfgang Ruge, who was denounced in 1980 for making incautious 
remarks about his years in Soviet exile – and in the same breath criticising the SED’s control 
over history writing – at a meeting of the party committee at the research institute where he 
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had worked since 1956.
71
 Most were simply ignored, however, and had no outlets for 
describing their inner feelings. In an essay published in the 1990s, the East German Peter 
Erler convincingly showed how women returnees, especially those who were single, 
widowed or beyond working age, ‘suffered in particular as a result of the party-imposed 
silence and the need to deny a part of their own identities’.72 Expressions of private grief and 
sorrow indeed had no place in the classic narrative conventions of communist life writing.
73
   
What of the longer-term impact of the rehabilitation process on the SED as a ruling party? 
Given that many of the German victims of the 1930s purges had been old Spartacists like 
Martha and Fritz Globig, or daughters and sons of old Spartacists, the rehabiliations of 1955 
to 1962 meant a small but significant strengthening of this wing of the party, as opposed to 
the Ulbricht faction which represented those who had only joined the KPD in late 1920 when 
the party merged with the left-wing of the Independent Socialists (USPD).
74
 True, only one 
rehabiltated victim, Werner Eberlein, made it into the Politburo, and he had returned to 
Germany much earlier, in 1948. In general, those who worked their way up to the Central 
Committee or to positions as deputy ministers had, like Eberlein, already come back to the 
Soviet occupation zone before 1949. But a number of the post-1954 returnees did gain entry 
into the lower ranks of party officialdom, including Fritz Globig, the ex-husband of the 
above-named Martha Globig, who worked for the regional party leadership in Leipzig after 
returning to the GDR in 1955 and was a recipient of the Karl Marx Order in 1962;
75
 or the 
Prague-born German-Jewish communist Adele Schiffmann, who was arrested in Smolensk in 
1938, returned to the GDR in 1959 as a newly-rehabilitated purge victim, and had several 
honours bestowed on her, such as the ‘medal for fighters against fascism’ (as early as 1959); 
the German-Soviet friendship award in gold (1974); the Vaterländischer Verdienstorden in 
bronze (1975) and silver (1985); and the Hermann Duncker medal (1981).
76
 In this sense, it 
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would be wrong to say that 1956 was entirely ‘business as usual’ for the SED or that the 
rehabilitation on offer was a mere sham or Scheinrehabilitierung.
77
 Some changes and 
adjustments had been necessary, however small and however cosmetic. 
It is in respect to transforming the broader ‘political imaginary’ in the GDR and ‘re-
evaluat[ing].... the status of the enemy’ against whom one was fighting78 that the SED’s 
approach to rehabilitation fell short on a more serious and sustained level. Admittedly the 
language used by Ulbricht in March 1956 in his first official newspaper article responding to 
Khrushchev’s speech indicated that Stalinism was morally, if not politically, dead.79 Terror as 
a weapon in the battle for socialism would no longer be condoned; instead more subtle 
technqiues of political repression were required. Nonetheless, what Buck-Morss calls the 
‘concrete, visual field’ of a historically-ordained struggle against the ‘class enemy’, waged by 
the party-state in the name of the broader ‘collective’ of all East German citizens, continued 
to dominate the SED’s ideological approach and its representational ‘positioning’ in the Cold 
War.
80
 Above all the GDR was cast by its leaders in the late 1950s and 1960s as the ‘better 
Germany’ (in contrast to the ‘militaristic’ FRG), and as a society built by unsullied heroes (in 
contrast to the ‘decadent’ west). In their life stories written for the SED archive, rehabilitated 
party veterans could celebrate their opposition to Social Democrats under the Weimar 
Republic, their contribution to the war against fascism in Spain in the late 1930s, their 
fearless resistance to Nazism during Soviet exile, and their triumphant return to the GDR; but 
they also knew better than to make any connection between German communism and 
Stalinist terror or to question the SED’s beneficence in quietly readmitting them into its 
ranks. If they accepted censorship at home as a necessary means of battling against internal 
class enemies and protecting the GDR’s all-important relationship with the Soviet Union,81 
publication of critical texts abroad – especially in West Germany – was a step which very few 
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returning victims would take, out of fear of being labelled disloyal. Besides which, should 
these informal mechanisms of control ever fail, they were backed up by a harsh penal code 
which made unsanctioned contacts with western publishing houses or human rights groups 
equivalent to the crime of ‘landesverräterische Nachrichtenübermittlung’ (treasonous 
disclosure of state secrets), carrying with it a possible prison sentence of two to 12 years.
82
 
Only in the years 1988-90 was the silence that had pervaded this issue for so long gradually 
and half-heartedly lifted. In stops and starts, and beginning with a hedged statement by the 
party in June 1988 ahead of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the KPD,
83
 the East 
German population was slowly made aware of the truth about the German victims of Stalin 
and the complete inadequacy of the party’s response to Khrushchev’s partial revelations in 
1956. Part of this was a consequence of pressures on the SED coming from the west, 
including from the more perestroika-friendly West German Communist Party (DKP) and, 
with greater force and consistency, from Hermann Weber’s research centre on the history of 
the GDR based at the University of Mannheim.
84
 But the main driver of change – as in the 
years 1953-56 – was the Soviet Union itself, a fact which was all too quickly forgotten in the 
anti-communist euphoria that followed German reunification in the early 1990s. 
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